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1. Background 
The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge – three maritime features located at the eastern entrance of the 
Straits of Singapore – began in December 1979 when Malaysia published a map 
depicting Pedra Branca as lying within its territorial waters. A few months later, 
Singapore sent a diplomatic note rejecting Malaysia’s claim to Pedra Branca and 
requesting a correction of the map. Attempts to settle the dispute by bilateral 
negotiations were made from 1993 to 1994. The question of sovereignty over 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge was raised during these negotiations. Faced with 
a lack of progress, both parties decided to submit the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice on 24 July 2003. According to the Special Agreement signed by 
the parties, the Court was requested to determine whether sovereignty over these 
features belongs to Malaysia or Singapore. 
Pedra Branca, also named Pulau Batu Puteh by Malaysia, is a granite 
outcrop located 25 nautical miles east of Singapore, 7.7 nautical miles south of 
Johor, Malaysia, and 7.6 nautical miles north of the Indonesian island of Bintan. 
During the low water spring tide, it measures 137 meters long with an average 
width of 60 meters. Between March 1850 and October 1851 a lighthouse was 
constructed on Pedra Branca. The “Horsburgh lighthouse” occupies most of its 
surface at high tide and has been in operation since its first lighting in October 
1851. Pedra Branca was the main feature concerned in the dispute. Middle Rocks 
consists of two clusters of small rocks separated by 250 meters at 0.6 nautical 
miles south of Pedra Branca and South Ledge, located at 2.2 nautical miles south-
south-west of Pedra Branca, is visible only at low tide. 
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, 
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p. 12 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf); 
- Declaration of Judge Ranjeva 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14494.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14496.pdf); 
- Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Simma and Abraham 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14498.pdf); 
- Declaration of Judge Bennouna 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14500.pdf); 
- Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14502.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Sreenivasa Rao 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14504.pdf).  
 
 
3. Analysis 
According to Singapore’s memorial, the status of Pedra Branca as of 1847 was 
that of terra nullius. The planning and the construction of the Horsburgh 
lighthouse thus constituted a taking of lawful possession à titre de souverain of 
Pedra Branca by agents of the British Crown. Singapore argued that it acquired 
the title over Pedra Branca in 1847-1851 and that this title has been “maintained 
by the British Crown and its lawful successor, the Republic of 
Singapore”(paragraph 39 of the Judgment). 
On the contrary, Malaysia argued that it had “original title” to Pedra 
Branca, which then “could not at any relevant time be considered terra nullius”. 
The presence of Singapore on it for the construction and the maintenance of the 
lighthouse was “insufficient to vest sovereignty in it” (paragraphs 37 and 38).  
The Court examined first whether the Sultanate of Johor, predecessor of 
Malaysia, held original title to Pedra Branca and effectively retained it up to the 
1840s (paragraph 46). According to the Court, Pedra Branca “had always been 
known as a navigational hazard in the Straits of Singapore, an important channel 
for international navigation in east-west trade connecting the Indian Ocean with 
the South China Sea”, and that it is consequently “impossible that the island 
could have remained unknown or undiscovered by the local community (…). 
Pedra Branca evidently was not terra incognita” (paragraph 61). Furthermore, the 
Court noted that “as far as the territorial domain of the Sultanate of Johor was 
concerned, it did cover in principle all the islands and islets within the Straits of 
Singapore, which lay in the middle of this Kingdom, and thus included the island 
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of Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh” (paragraph 68). The Court took into 
consideration the fact that the island territories belonging to the Sultanate of 
Johor had never been challenged throughout its entire history. This led the Court 
to conclude that the condition of “continuous and peaceful display of territorial 
sovereignty”, as set forth in the Island of Palmas case, was satisfied. The Court 
thus agreed with Malaysia’s position and adjudged that the Sultan of Johor had 
effectively held original title on Pedra Branca (paragraph 117). At the time when 
the British started their preparations for the construction of the lighthouse in 
1844, Pedra Branca was thus under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Johor. 
The Court had moreover to consider Singapore’s argument, that even if 
Malaysia could show original title to Pedra Branca, sovereignty still belong to 
Singapore as it had “exercised continuous sovereignty over the island while 
Malaysia has done nothing” (paragraph 123). This argument is based on the 
construction starting from 1844, and operation since then, of the lighthouse by 
the United Kingdom and then Singapore. To determine whether Malaysia 
retained sovereignty over Pedra Branca following the construction of the 
lighthouse or, on the contrary, whether sovereignty passed to Singapore, the 
Court took in consideration various relevant facts that occurred since 1844. 
The Court considered significant among these facts an exchange of 
correspondence that took place in 1953 between the Colonial Secretary of 
Singapore and the Acting State Secretary of Johor. The purpose of the letter send 
by the Colonial Secretary of Singapore was to ask for clarification on the legal 
status of Pedra Branca. The response sent three months later by the Acting State 
Secretary of Johor affirmed explicitly that “the Johor Government does not claim 
ownership of Pedra Branca” (paragraph 221). 
Analyzing the conduct of the parties after 1953, the Court furthermore 
found several instances of conduct by Singapore that supported its argument. 
These acts included Singapore’s investigations of shipwrecks around the Pedra 
Branca waters, with no protest from Malaysia until June 2003 when the Special 
Agreement submitting the dispute to the Court came into force (paragraph 231), 
its requirement that Malaysian officials seek and obtain permission for visits to 
Pedra Branca (paragraph 235), the display of the British and Singapore ensigns on 
the island (paragraph 244), the installation by Singapore of military 
communications equipment in 1977 (paragraph 247) and its proposed land 
reclamation project on Pedra Branca (paragraph 249). 
Moreover, the Court took into consideration facts indicative of Malaysia’s 
belief that Singapore was sovereign over Pedra Branca. Indeed, Malaysia had 
referred to the lighthouse as a “Singapore” station in the 1959 and 1967 joint 
meteorological reports, and when the two countries began separate 
meteorological reports in 1967, Malaysia omitted the lighthouse in their report of 
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that year (paragraph 265). Between 1962 and 1975, Malaysia furthermore 
published six maps depicting Pedra Branca as part of Singapore’s territory 
(paragraph 272). The Court also considered of interest the fact that Malaysia only 
protested against Singapore flying its ensign on Pulau Pisang but not on Pedra 
Branca (paragraph 244). 
For these reasons, the Court concluded that by 1980 sovereignty over 
Pedra Branca had passed from Malaysia to Singapore (paragraph 276). 
With respect to Middle Rocks, the Court ruled that the issue of its legal 
status was to be assessed in the context of the Court’s reasoning on the principal 
issue in the case. Among the reasons that led the Court to adjudge that 
sovereignty over Pedra Branca had passed to Singapore, none of them apply to 
other maritime features in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. For this reason, Middle 
Rocks should be understood to have had the “same legal status as Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh as far as the ancient original title (…) was concerned” 
(paragraph 290). Middle Rocks were thus to remain under Malaysian sovereignty. 
This reasoning does however not apply to South Ledge as that, given the 
lack of definitive custom and treaty law, “a general assumption that low-tide 
elevations are territory in the same sense as islands” cannot be made (paragraph 
296). The Court recalled to the parties that while it had a specific mandate to 
decide the sovereignty for each of the three maritime features concerned, it had 
not been called upon to delimit their territorial waters. For this reason, South 
Ledge belongs to the State “in the territorial waters of which it is located” 
(paragraph 298). 
 
 
4. Issues: Passing of Sovereignty and Loss of Territory 
The interest of this case lies essentially in its clarification of the criteria required 
in order to transfer sovereignty from a State possessing an original title to 
another State. This could happen, for example, through an express agreement 
between the parties (paragraph 120). In the absence of such agreement in the 
present case, the key question was that of consent of the original sovereign to 
cede the territory. The Court found two distinct modes of acquisition of 
derivative title: tacit agreement arising from, and reflected in, the conduct of the 
parties (paragraph 120) and failure of the State which has sovereignty to respond 
to conduct à titre de souverain of the other State (paragraph 121).  
With respect to the first hypothesis, the Court emphasized that any passing 
of sovereignty on the basis of the conduct of the parties “must be manifested 
clearly and without any doubt by that conduct and the relevant facts (…) 
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especially so if what may be involved, in the case of one of the parties, is in effect 
the abandonment of sovereignty over part of its territory” (paragraph 122). 
In the second hypothesis and according to the Island of Palmas award, the 
State which has sovereignty must fail to respond to manifestations of sovereignty 
by another State. The absence of reaction may well then amount to acquiescence 
or to a “tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party 
may interpret as consent” (paragraph 121). 
As pointed out by Coalter G. Lathrop, the Court does not explicitly choose 
between these two modes. However, the language used throughout the judgment 
– “evolving views” (paragraph 162), “developing understanding” (paragraph 203) 
or “convergent evolution of the positions of the Parties” (paragraph 276) – could 
indicate that the Court was searching for a tacit agreement between the parties 
and thus applied the first mode of acquisition. Furthermore, applying the second 
mode could result in the transfer of sovereignty from one State to another 
without the consent of the holder of the legal title, but only where a lack of 
reaction could be interpreted by the other party as consent. As Judges Simma and 
Abraham observed in their joint dissenting opinion, this possibility is at least 
arguable.  
Another question is to determine if, and according to the Court’s words, 
this consent was “manifested clearly and without any doubt by that conduct and 
the relevant facts”. The “major significance” given by the Court to the above 
mentioned correspondence of 1953 is important in that context. As Judge ad hoc 
Dugard rightly pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the fact that at this time the 
Sultan of Johor was not a fully independent State but a protectorate may have 
weakened the authority of its Acting State Secretary to pronounce on matters of 
sovereignty.  
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